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I. Measures of Time Use and Social Indicators 
 
A. Time Use in National Accounting 
 
How should time use be included in our accounting frameworks. Traditional 
economic accounts center primarily on market transactions. But much of economic 
activity, and in all likelihood much of economic welfare, depends upon activities outside 
of the market place. Moreover, although we do not yet have economic accounts that 
incorporate the use of time, it is plausible that the economic value of time is the most 
important single non-market input, and perhaps also non-market output. 
 
I will consider three issues relating to the use of time in this essay. First, how 
might we integrate time into our economic accounts? Second, are attempts to use 
hedonic psychology likely to be a fruitful way of valuing time in our economic accounts? 
Third, do measures of emotions have the property of “interpersonal cardinality” that is 
required to construct quantitative social indicators? 
 
To begin with, it is worth reflecting on the importance of time use for non-market 
economic activity. Non-market activity consists of activities like education, recreation 
and other uses of leisure time, babysitting, home production of laundry and similar 
services, along with work-related activities like commuting. The inputs into these 
activities consist of non-market and market labor, capital services, and material inputs. 
By far the largest inputs for non-market activity are labor (time). Indeed, virtually the 
entire value added of the non-market sectors comes from time inputs, while most of the 
non-time inputs are purchased in the market economy. 
 
 Consider the cost of home production (such as doing the laundry). The total value of 
such activities consists of the value of purchased market inputs (soap, washing 
machines, electricity, and the like) plus the value of the time spent in the activities. For 
                                                            
1 This is a preliminary version of a paper presented to the NBER Workshop on Time Use. The 
author is grateful to many participants, particularly Alan Krueger, for comments.  
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example, doing the family laundry might have total cost of $21, of which $20 (1 hour × 
$20 per hour) is the value of the time, while $1 is the cost of the soap and washing-
machine services. Virtually all the non-market inputs are likely to be time. 
 
 The same story holds for virtually every non-market activity: the major non-market 
input is labor. The one important exception might be the inputs of non-market 
environmental capital (clean air, clean water, public beaches) that enter into recreation 
and health activities. These examples suggest that measuring and valuing time use may 
be the most important single component of non-market accounts. 
 
 Up to recently, the United States had been particularly laggard with respect to 
generating comprehensive and periodic time-use statistics. Fortunately, beginning in 
2003, the Bureau of Labor Statistics began the collection of a large time-use survey for the 
United States (the American Time Use Survey, or ATUS).2 In the latest survey year, 2006, 
this survey interviewed 13,000 households annually from the out-rotating panel of the 
Current Population Survey. It is currently the only time-use survey in the world to be 
conducted on a continuous basis. The ATUS will be an important addition to the U.S. 
statistical system and a crucial ingredient in the future construction of augmented 
accounts. In addition, there are now harmonized historical data on time use, such as the 
American Heritage Time Use Study (AHTUS).3 The time of time-use studies has arrived. 
 
B. Two Approaches to Quantitative Indicators on Time Use 
 
 In developing quantitative social indicators to integrate time use, we can consider 
two fundamentally different approaches. The first approach would be to use the 
methodology of national economic accounting. This approach, which has been 
considered in the literature on augmented and non-market accounts, would add the 
“consumption and production of time” to the accounts. To implement this strategy, we 
would need to develop a set of prices or values to weight the time consumptions, after 
which time could be added to apples and pears using the standard methodology of 
economic accounts. As I will indicate in the first part of this study, while this approach 
would conform to standards of national economic accounting, the data requirements are 
both theoretically and practically far beyond what is currently available. 
                                                            
2 A review of the BLS time-use survey is contained at http://www.bls.gov/atus/home.htm . 
 
3 The web page containing a description is at http://www.timeuse.org/ahtus/ . 
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 A second approach, which has developed along a parallel track with an entirely 
different approach to valuation, is in the spirit of emotions research. This would include 
overall measures of emotions, such as happiness and misery; it might also attach 
emotions to particular activities, such as unemployment or the time spent watching 
television. This approach was pioneered by F. Thomas Juster and is followed in the 
study by Alan B. Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, and 
Arthur A. Stone (hereafter KKSSS).4 This approach uses a completely different approach 
to measuring the values associated with time uses – one based on surveys or other 
psychometric measurements. The second part of this study addresses the potential for 
use of hedonic psychology and emotions research in constructing quantitative social 
indicators. 
 
II. Time Accounts Using the Approach of National Economic Accounting  
 
This section examines the incorporation of time use into the standard national 
economic accounts. It derives equilibrium conditions for consumer behavior with market 
and non-market consumption along with process or intrinsic values of time in different 
activities. (“Process values” or “intrinsic values” are terms that are used to represent the 
preference value of the time itself rather than the things produced by time.) Using a 
standard index-number approach, we show that a full set of accounts has data 
requirements that are far beyond those that are currently or prospectively available, with 
problems particularly arising for the valuation of time and for measuring technological 
change for non-market consumption and use of time. However, in a simplified case, we 
show that the growth of real income can be approximated by a weighted average of 
productivity growth rates in market and non-market productivity and that the valuation 
of hours drops out of the formula. We examine the case of a representative consumer. 
Further difficult issues, such as aggregation of diverse individuals or households, are 
discussed briefly.  
 
A. Consumer Preferences and Equilibrium Conditions 
 
                                                            
4 F. Thomas Juster, “Preferences for Work and Leisure,” in F.T. Juster and F.P. Stafford, eds., 
Time, Goods, and Well-being.  Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan, 1985, pp. 333-51; Alan B. 
Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, and Arthur A. Stone, “National 
Time Accounting: The Currency of Life,” paper presented at the National Bureau of Economic 




I begin with a standard analysis of how consumers allocate their time and choose 
consumption. For this purpose, I assume that preferences are time-separable and 
examine the ith consumer deciding at time t. The consumer can choose to work in the 
market and buy market goods; work at home and produce home goods; and use time to 
enjoy leisure or non-work activities. In general, we separate time used in home 
production from leisure by the definition that the time used in home production can be 
substituted for by the time of others (such as washing dishes), while the activities in 
leisure cannot be produced by others (such as playing golf). 
 
We begin with the determinants of consumer choice as represented by a standard 
ordinal preference function. (I call this a “preference function” instead of a “utility 
function” to reserve the latter for the psychological hedonics below.) W is an ordinal 
index that represents more preferred combinations of bundles as higher values, while U 
is a standard preference function for individual i at time t.  
 

















 = market consumption,
 = home consumption,
= market hours,
= home work hours, 
= leisure and non - work time,




l change in non - market time,
= technological change in leisure.
 
This formulation is unusual in the literature on time use in specifically 
incorporating a process value or intrinsic value of time. It is also novel in allowing for 
the possibility of technological change that makes time spent more or less pleasant. This 
specification recognizes that “leisure time” is generally an input into a technology that 
produces the desired experience. For example, “listening to music” involves not only 
time but also complementary inputs such as equipment, space, background noise, and 
performance quality. Some time may be experienced as unpleasant (such as in dental 
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surgery) but these are nowhere as unpleasant as before anesthetics. Some examples 
would be the development of technologies that make work more pleasant (such as 
ventilation or air conditioning of factories), that make home work more pleasant (such as 
dishwashers), and that make leisure more pleasant (such as improved television sets). 
The point is that technologies can make non-market time more productive (by using 
machines rather than hand washing), but technologies can also make the experiences 
themselves more preferred. Of course, as in the case of air travel or airline food, time 
spent can also become more unpleasant. 
 
 Note that the preference function in (1) is not separable over activities. Most work 
on estimating the process value of time, going back to Juster and continuing with KKSSS, 
assumes that the preference function is to be separable across different time uses.5 This 
assumption has been viewed as inappropriate and incompatible with empirical evidence 
in preference theory for many decades and is especially objectionable for time use (we 
discuss this point further below).6 
 
The consumer has three constraints: an income constraint relating to market 
consumption, a home production function relating home work and home consumption, 
and a time budget. The analysis uses a skeletal model that strips away inessential 
elements. The first constraint is that market consumption equals a fixed element (fringe 
benefits plus property income plus net transfers) plus market hours times the marginal 
wage: 
 




We simplify the analysis by assuming that there are no lump-sum elements and that 
marginal compensation is proportional to the average productivity of market labor for 
that individual, , so: , ,=m mi t i tw A
 
5 F. Thomas Juster, “Preferences for Work and Leisure,” in F.T. Juster and F.P. Stafford, eds., 
Time, Goods, and Well-being. Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan, 1985, pp. 333-51; Alan B. 
Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, and Arthur A. Stone, “National 
Time Accounting: The Currency of Life,” paper presented at the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Time Use Conference, December 7-8, 2007. 
 
6 George Stigler, “The Development of Utility Theory. I,” The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 58, 









Home production is given by the home production function: 
 




i tA is the productivity of per hour worked of home production. 
  
 
 Finally, we have the time budget constraint: 
 
, , ,(5)             m nm li t i t i t i th h h h= + + ,  
 
Total time is , .i th  
 
We assume that preferences and resources are intertemporally separable. This 
assumption is purely for expositional convenience and does not change the 
measurements or analysis. Maximizing the preference function subject to the budget 
constraints yields the following two first-order conditions. In the balance of this 
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For notational convenience, , , 1,π =k t k t tU U is the marginal rate of substitution 
between the kth argument of the preference function in (1) and market consumption, 
, = ∂ ∂k t kU U x is the derivative of U with respect to the kth elements, and the marginal 
rates of substitution are time dated to recognize that the marginal preferences change 




Equation (6) states that the marginal preference value of leisure should equal to 
the net value of an hour in the market in producing goods. Equation (7) states that the 
marginal preference value of leisure should equal the net value of an hour of home work 
in producing home goods.  
 
These conditions differ from standard practice in one major respect: Each 
equilibrium condition recognizes that there may be process or intrinsic values of time in 
different activities (market work and home work) and that these values therefore need to 
be netted out in the calculation. Most analyses of time use assume that the marginal 
preference value of work is equal in the market and at home and further assume a 
homogeneous output. From these assumptions, we get the standard condition that the 
productivity of home production equals the marginal post-tax wage. There are also 
many unobservable variables in this approach, which will come back to haunt us when 
we attempt to construct an empirical measure reflecting the underlying preference 
function. 
 
B. Measuring Real Income with Apples, Pears, and Hours 
 
We now consider the question of how to measure real income when we include the 
“consumption of time” along with consumption of goods and services – we want to add 
apples, pears, and hours, so to speak. In developing an index in the absence of complete 
data, the equilibrium conditions are necessary for developing the theory.7 
 
In this section, we are interested in devising a measure of “real income” that is the 
analog of real income in the theory of income and prices. The concept underlying the 
approach is Becker’s concept of “whole income.”8   We begin by transforming the 
preference function in (1) into an index of real whole income for individual i at time t: 
 





7 The approach followed here follows the standard approach to the development of indexes of 
real income and expenditures. See for example W. Erwin Diewert, “Index Numbers,” in J. 
Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, Eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Volume 2,  
Macmillan, London, 1987, pp. 767-780. 
 
8 Gary S. Becker, “A Theory of the Allocation of Time,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 75, No. 299, 
Sept. 1965, pp. 493-517. 
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The function R is an ordinal transformation of U such that, along the equilibrium 
path, R is locally homothetic. This implies that the rate of growth of real income is 
measured as: 
 
(9) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
m m nm nm m m m
t t t t t t t
nm nm nm l l l
t t t t t t
g R s c g c s c g c s h g B h






In this equation, is the proportional rate of growth of the element and ( )g ⋅ ( )s ⋅ is the 
elasticity of the real income function with respect to that element. In a market context, 
the elasticities are the expenditure shares of each element in whole income using the 
market or preference prices of each element. The expenditure shares are defined as 
5
, , , ,
1
( ) π π
=
= ∑k t k t k t k t k t
k
,s x x x . In this expression, is the kth element; ,k tx
, , 1, , 1,k t k t t k t tR R U Uπ = =  is the marginal rate of substitution between item k and 
market consumption; item k represents the kth element in the preference or real-income 
function; and subscripts k = 1 through 5 represent market consumption, non-market 
consumption, market time, non-market time, and leisure time. 
Note that for globally homothetic U functions, R is uniquely defined. Moreover, 
this procedure assumes that U is a smooth function. If the U function is not globally 
homothetic, R will depend upon the path of consumption and prices. This property is 
shared with all superlative indexes. 
There are different alternatives to aggregating indexes over individual consumers 
to construct a social index. The usual index, following Robert Pollak, uses the approach 
of the “plutocratic index” in which each (real) dollar is equally weighted.9 This then 
yields a growth rate in the total or national index that is simply the sum of the individual 
indexes where the individual indexes are weighted by each individual’s share of total 
consumption. We will omit this step for brevity and because it adds nothing important 
in the current context. 
 
C. The fundamental measurement problem 
 
                                                            
9 The concepts are discussed in Robert A. Pollak, ”The Consumer Price Index: A Research 




Our theory now collides with a fundamental measurement difficulty. Our 
measure of the growth of real whole income requires measures of both the items in the 
preference function as well as the marginal preference values. Only one of these, market 
consumption, has comprehensive measures, although we now have reasonably complete 
measures of hours for the U.S. since 2003. We have no reasonably accurate measures of 
home consumption. Furthermore, we have no measures at all of the marginal rates of 
substitution between time and market consumption (the  ,k tπ ). And we have no 
measures of any of the technological variables outside the marketplace (the ). In 
other words, any attempt to measure whole income is doomed to failure for lack of 




D. A simplified measure of income growth 
 
 We can develop a substitute for the ideal growth index with some further 
assumptions. First, we assume that there is no technological change in the technology of 
time use. In other words, the ktB  = 1 for all k. Second, we assume that it is possible to 
measure the productivity of non-market work. Denote variables with dots over them as 
time derivatives. We then rewrite equation (9) as: 
 







We take the time derivatives of equations (3) and (4), obtaining: 
 
   (11) m mt t t tc w h w h= +
(12) nm nm nm nm nmt t t tc A h A h= +  
 












From the first-order conditions in (6) and (7) and the time budget constraint in (4), we 
have , which reduces the expression in (13) to 0tΨ =
 






We then make one further simplification. We take the shares in equation (9) to be 
the shares of whole consumption rather than whole income, where whole consumption 
is equal to market plus non-market consumption. Substituting from (4) that the growth 
in market income is , this implies that the growth in real income is: / /m m mt t tw w A A=
 
(15) ( ) / ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )m m nm nmt t t t t t tg R R R g A c g A cσ σ= = +  
where are the rates of productivity growth in the market and the 
non-market consumption sectors, and the weights are the shares of the two items in 
whole consumption, 
( )  (m ntg A g A and
( )( )m m m nm nmt t t t tc c c cσ π= + and 
( )( ) .nm nm nm m nm nmt t t t t tc c c cσ π π= +  
We can get a slightly more intuitive result if we simplify further. Assume that the 
marginal preference value of market work is equal to the marginal preference value of 
home work and that the marginal product of home work is equal to the marginal 
compensation of market work. These assumptions imply that the weights in (15) are 
proportional to and , which yields: mh nmh
(16) ( ) ( ) ( )
m n
t tm nm
t t tm nm m nm
t t t t
h h
g R g A g A
h h h h
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
= +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
m
from the equation for the growth of real income. Only the growth rates of productivity in 
the two consumption sectors, and their shares, enter into the growth equation. 
 
Equations (15) and (16) are the fundamental results. The simpler expression in 
(16) states that the growth in real income is equal to the weighted growth of market and 
home productivity, where the weights are the relative importance of market time and 
home-work time. This is completely intuitive in emphasizing that the productivity of 
non-market time is a key ingredient in economic welfare. The important and non-
intuitive result in equations (15) and (16) is that the valuation of hours can be eliminated 
-10- 
 
The correct growth rate would be slightly different if we made different 
assumptions about differences in marginal preference values or relative productivities of 
home production, but equation (16) provides
 
so that there is no 
technological change i
t 
asures? According to the ATUS, time devoted to market and non-
market work were approximately the same in 2003-2006 (3.5 hours per day for market 
to home 
uation 
 the basic intuition. Note that the only 
difference between (15) and (16) is the relative size of the weights. 
The results depend upon strong assumptions, however. They require not only
that the consumer equilibrium conditions in (6) and (7) hold, but al
n the enjoyment of time. While we might worry that these are 
unrealistic, it is hard to imagine any series of measurements that could shed much ligh
on these issues. 
How much does the growth in real income given in equation (16) differ from 
conventional me
work v. 3.8 hours per day for non-market work). This indicates that the welfare 
significance of productivity growth in non-market work is of the same order of 
importance as productivity growth in market work. We have virtually no serious 
research on the relative importance of market productivity growth as compared 
productivity growth, so the relative importance of the two terms in the welfare eq
(16) is currently unknown. 
E. Graphical approach 
We can show the results graphically as follows. To derive the graphical results, we 
sim erence function is additively separable, so  plify by assuming that the pref
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))       m nm m nm lt cm t cnm t hm t hnm t hl tW U c U c U h U h U h= + + + +
 
(17  
The are separable preference functions for each of the time elements in (1) (note 
at this is a simplification and should not be used in practice). Define the net marginal 
( )U i
th
preference value of an hour of market work, home work, and leisure, respectively, as 
  
( ) ( ) ( )m m mcm t t hm tN h U ' c w U ' h= +
( ) ( ) (
( ) ( )
nm nm nm
cnm t t hnm t
l l
hl
N h U ' c A U ' h










( ) ( ) ( )U h(18) m nmN h N h M= = l   
Figure 1 shows a Jevons stick diagram for the allocation of time using separable 
utility and using only two activities, market work and leisure. The downward sloping 
line ing 
m 
 shows the net marginal preference value of market work, while the upward slop
line shows the marginal preference value of leisure, with leisure measured leftward fro
the right axis. At the equilibrium, E, the net marginal preference value of market work is 
equalized to the marginal preference value of leisure time, with market work being the 
segment WE and leisure time being the segment EZ. 
III. Valuation Using Direct Measurement via Hedonic Psychology  
 
A. What are we attempting to measure? 
 lopment of quantitative valuation of 
time use using the standard approach of na ting and determined 
in standard preference theory in economics 
are ind  
mation 
vels 
ss individuals. I will call this 
charac ly 
d to 
The first part of this analysis examined the deve
tional economic accoun
that the standard account appears to have excessively demanding requirements for 
valuation. We now examine the potential of the techniques of emotions research and 
hedonic psychology to value time in different activities and to develop quantitative 
social indicators. 
Before discussing different approaches, we begin with some definitions of 
different kinds of variables. Most functions 
ividually ordinal. This indicates that these functions can be transformed by a
monotonic function and yield the same observable outcomes. In some economic 
applications, such as behavior toward risk, functions are individually cardinal. This 
indicates that the variable or function is unique up to a linear monotonic transfor
for each person. Both are individual in the sense that there is no method by which le
can be compared across different individuals.  
To serve as a quantitative social indicator, a function or variable must have a 
cardinal scale that is meaningfully defined acro
teristic interpersonally cardinal. This means that the variable must have a unique
defined zero and a well-defined unit of increment, and there must be a metho
compare the values across individuals. This implies that the zero and the increment 
must be stable across time and people and countries.10 Consumption is an 
                                                            
10 This point can be illustrated with a simple example. Assume that we are interested in 
comparing the happiness of two groups, calculated as the average happiness of each group. (i) 
Under an ordinal measure, there is no meaningful way of taking averages of indexes that simply 
provide greater than or less than rankings. We might make Pareto rankings, as is done in welfare 
-12- 
 
interpersonally cardinal variable because my personal consumption expend
added to yours as long as we respect the convention of using the same prices and 
commodities; consumption has a natural zero and a natural unit of increment, and
are comparable across individuals. Interpersonal cardinality has much tighter 
constraints than personal cardinality, which in turn is stricter than ordinality.
itures can be 
 these 
 
The development of quantitative social indicators using measures of emotions such 
as h f 




ng of hedonic experience 




appiness using hedonic psychology could take three potential paths. We can think o
these as proceeding from least demanding to most demanding of the data and analytical 
constructs. 
A first approach, which is the spirit of th
elopment of the U-index by KKSSS, has been to develop measures of the 
instantaneous or average flow of emotions such as happiness, pain, and the li
are analogous to estimates of global mean temperature. They are measurements that are
not attached to particular causes or activities. A significant body of research is devoted 
to this strategy, as is summarize by Kahneman, Diener, and Schwartz in their overview 
of a compendium of studies in their edited volume, Well-Being: 12 
We are particularly hopeful that a scientific understandi
pleasantness of life in the everyday experiences of people….To this end, we p
that nations should begin monitoring pleasure and pain through on-line experience 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
economics, but these would continue to be ordinal measures. (ii) Assume that the happiness 
scales are individually cardinal but not interpersonally cardinal across groups. The happiness 
measures of group A are (1, 7) for an average of 4, while those of group B are (2, 4) for an average 
of 3. Under the original scaling, group A is happier than group B. By individual cardinality, we 
can add, say, 5 to each value in group B and maintain all observable functions of the variable. 
After the rescaling, group B is happier than group A. (iii) Finally, assume that the scale is 
interpersonally cardinal, and can be transformed only by a common scale variable, k. Then the 
average value for A is always k4, which is always greater than group B’s k3. 
 
11 These definitions from economics differ from those used in other areas. In psychology, a 
cardinal scale is referred to as an “interval scale.” What is called interpersonally cardinal in this 
paper is referred to as “ratio measurement” in psychology. The terminology in psychology 
originated with S.S. Stevens, “On the theory of scales of measurement,” Science, 103, 1946, 677-
680. The related theory of measurement has over the last half-century sparked a fierce 
controversy in psychology with virtually no counterpart in economics.  
 
12 Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwartz, “Preface,” in Daniel Kahneman, Ed 
Diener, and Norbert Schwartz, Eds., Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, Russell 















Most of the measures developed in the three approaches described above assume 
at the magnitudes are interpersonally cardinal. Economists have come to regard 




ording among samples of respondents to complement existing social indicators, 
and to provide a more direct assessment of the final outcome about which 
most concerned. 
The second approach attempts to attribute emotions to particular causes or activities
s is analogous to saying that global warming is due to the accumulation of 
s brand of emotion research associates well-being with attributes 
s such as inflation, une
 the work of Thomas Juster and John Robinson before it, attempts to associate 
emotions with particular time-use activities. For example, the U-index of KKSS
to whether the maximum of the negative emotions exceeds the maximum of the positive
emotions. The discussion below points to several difficulties that arise in attribution, fo
example because the studies assume separability of time values over time and acti
 The third approach, which imbeds the analysis in the framework of national 
economic accounts developed in the first part of this paper, would aim to estimate the 
value of time as compared with other components of economic activity. The accounting 
framework values the time using the marginal rates of substitution or marginal values of 
time. This approach might be devoted to measuring the growth of whole income i
equation (9). This approach is the most demanding of the three because it requires 
estimating marginal valuations of time relative to other economic activities such as 
consumption of goods and services. It is possible that the psychometric approach could 
estimate the marginal rates of substitution, but this approach has not been pursued 
partly because of lack of interest and partly because of lack of data. 
 
B. Some difficulties with the hedonic approach 
th
rdinal measures of utility with suspicion. As Paul Samuels
With ever fewer exceptions, modern economic theorists believe that … everything 
interest and relevance in [the nonstochastic theory of consumer preference] can be
expressed in purely ordinal terms.  
 
13 Paul A. Samuelson, “Probability, Utility, and the Independence Axiom,” Econometrica, vol. 20, 






use asily summarized. Most measures in emotions 
s 
I review several issues that arise in the application of hedonic measurements in the 
struction of quantitative indicators both generally and specifically as applied to tim
. The fundamental problem can be e
research can best be described as ordinal, and few or none would seem to be 
interpersonally cardinal in the sense defined above. Statistical operations (such as 
averages over space or time) on ordinal variables are not invariant to monotonic 
transformations of the variables. We will therefore get different answers depending 
upon the scaling of our measures. This implies that these variables are not useful a
quantitative social indicators. 
a. Difficulties in measuring marginal values 
The first issue arises when we attempt to put valuations on time in the context of 
“utility analysis” or “preference analysis.” What are we attempting to measure with our 
indexes o  the equilibrium 
conditions for utility maximization are met? O
 
rature.) 
This approach would be necessar
nd 
 




f emotion or happiness? Are we trying to test whether
r, are we attempting to estimate the total 
or average of the emotional values for each activity (the total is the area under the 
different marginal value curves and above some zero level of time in Figure 1)? 
 
Begin with the question of using hedonic measures to measure the equilibrium 
values of time, such as those that are needed for equations (5) and (6). (It should be
emphasized that this has not been the objective of much of the psychometric lite
y to value the impact of policies or shocks that shift 
time use among different activities. The problem, as in shown in Figure 2, is that it is 
difficult to ensure that we are capturing equilibrium valuations in a slice-of-time 
sampling methodology. The value of a time slice will be given by the point on the net 
marginal value curves where the time slice is taken. We show four different slices: A a
B are ones where market work is sampled, while C is one where leisure is sampled, 
while E is an hour that is just at the indifference point. 
 
Even in the situation where we have perfectly resolved the issues of how to 
measure process value – we have the perfect hedonimeter – we are almost certain to
capture above-equilibrium slices of time. It is very unlik
nt E, which is the point at which the values of the marginal hours are 
equalized. While many studies do not attempt to measure the equilibrium value, thes
measures are the standard approach for evaluating policies or shocks that reallocate 
hours among different uses for individuals who are making purposive use of their time.
 




 Many studies of happiness are concerned with measuring total or average value or 
utility from different uses of time. Attempting to measure total utility falls into the 
conceptu  that we want to measure the 




al morass called the “zero problem.”14 Suppose
integrate the marginal surpluses between some “zero” level and current consumption. 
But what do we mean by zero? Is it literally zero water consumption (in which case 
consumer surplus is equal to the value of life itself)? Or is it the level of consumption i
pre-industrial times? If the latter, should pre-industrial times relate to the 1700s, when 
water in the U.S. was plentiful? Or to the time when humans first crossed the Bering 
land bridge, when ice was plentiful but water was scarce? In time-use studies, should w
consider the surplus of time spent breathing? If so, would this include the first minute a
well as the marginal minute? If we attempt to measure total surpluses for necessities in 
too many areas with low “zeroes,” we will undoubtedly find ourselves with multiple 
infinities of the value of time. 
 
c. Difficulties due to non-storability of time 
While some studies of happiness and time use might limit themselves to pure 
measurement, virtually every study goes on to attribute well-being to particular 
activities or other determinants. The KKSSS study, for example, associates the U-index 
with diffe
l 
e could be allocated to different activities without 




rent time-use activities. 
 
The next set of issues revolves around the difficulties of attributing time to 
particular time-use activities because of an oversimplified set of assumptions. One 
concern revolves around the fact that time is a non-storable commodity. In the analytica
section above, we assumed that tim
e is a heterogeneous commodity 
rather than a homogeneous lump that can be allocated continuously over tasks. For
example, I have an implicit contract with Yale that I will teach intermediate 
macroeconomics from 11:35 to 12:50 on a particular day. There is an important seminar 
going on at the same time, but I cannot both teach in one place and be in the seminar 
room at the same time. Some activities can be shifted over time, so that I can record the 
News Hour on my DVR and “move” it over time. But I cannot move my time over ti
 
 
14 See William Nordhaus, “Principles of National Accounting for Nonmarket Accounts,” in Dale 
W. Jorgenson, J. Steven Landefeld, and William D. Nordhaus, Eds., A New Architecture for the 
U.S. National Accounts, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006, pp. 143-160. 
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If we consider time as a non-storable commodity, we would need to estimate the 
time-use stick diagrams for each slice of time. In this respect, time is like electricity, 
which also cannot be cheaply stored. We see wide variations in hourly electricity prices, 





ust start at 8:30 am, and commuting must take place in the time just 
prior to the start of work. Peak time will have a higher shadow price. This implies that 
any
ing rigid schedules (for work, school, meetings, and so forth), we could easily find
that marginal valuations are all over the map depending on the extent of “time crun
or “time glut.”  
 
Treatment of non-storable time will lead to substantial complications in the analysi
The activities need to be represented with the appropriate time-stamped constraints. For
example, work m
 activity that is observed during peak times must have a high valuation. By contrast, 
off-peak times will have a low valuation. We may see that something – like watching TV 
– occurs in off-peak times and conclude that this is a low-value activity, whereas the 
truth is that it is simply occurring in off-peak periods. 
 
d. Difficulties due to simultaneous uses of time 
 
 similar difficulty in attributing well-being to activitiesA
n
 arises because time is very 
ofte  dev le talking on their cell 
phone while walking; these are clearly tw
communicating while traveling. We might be listening to the radio while driving to 
wo
tle 
 II. Assume 
that there is no technological change in time use and that there are n different kinds of 
oted to multiple purposes. We frequently encounter peop
o distinct and inseparable activities – 
rk. These are not isolated examples – simultaneous time use is pervasive. 
 
 Since little time-use research to date has been economic in its orientation, lit
attention has been given to the problem of joint production in time use. We can 
introduce simultaneous activities easily in the analytical apparatus of section
simultaneously enjoyed leisure time. Denote 5, ,k tπ as the marginal preference valu
the kth component of leisure time, where 5,1, t
e of 
π is the marginal preference value of the 
primary activity (perhaps measured by hedonic psychologists). The equilibrium 




3, 5,1, 5, ,
2
(19)             
n
t t t k
k
w π π π
=
+ = + ∑  t
This shows that if we identify only a single activity (activity k = 1), we might 
misest de 
e. Difficulties arising from non-separability of hedonic values
imate the marginal value of the hour. The general supposition is that we exclu
many valuable non-market time-use activities, which would lead to biased estimates of 





 A final issue relating to separability – which can be thought of as the general case 
vities 
meone who reports “eating and drinking,” the 
l 
 
• Sensory pleasure (especially culinary and sexual) is extremely context-
s and 
                                                           
involving time-separability and activity-separability – is that the emotional effects of 
experiences have deep and potentially unfathomable patterns of substitution and 
complementarity. So here again, attempting to attribute emotions to particular acti
may prove impossible. 
 For example, when we observe so
reported pleasures and pains are likely to depend upon the context and history as wel
as companions and quality of the food. The following summary provides a cautionary 
note on the difficulties of attaching experiential values to different activities as 
summarized by Rozin: 15 
dependent… 
• Most sensory pleasure is experienced in the remembered or anticipated domains, 
as opposed to the on-line (experienced) domain…. 
• Combinations of sensory pleasures do not obey any simple, hedonic algebra….It is 
not clear what we would even want to say about the pleasure of listening to 
Beethoven while eating our favorite food (and having a massage)…. 
• There is a large effect of experience on sensory pleasure. Hedonic shift
reversals are common. 
 
 
15 Paul Rozin, “Preadaptation and the Puzzles and Properties of Pleasure,” in Daniel Kahneman, 
Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwartz, Eds., Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, Russell 
Sage Foundation, New York, 1999, pp. 129. 
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Note particularly the difficulty of defining the pleasure of simultaneous activities such as 








. The lack of interpersonal cardinality
eating and listening to music. 
 This finding is critical to the interpretati
studies examining the value of time, including the KKSSS study, rely centrally on the 
assumption of separability of the preference function for different time uses. This 
assumption is clearly unwarranted on the basis of empirical studies of the psychol
sensory experiences. While additive utility was standard in the early years of the 
development of demand theory, it was Edgeworth – an early proponent of psycho
studies – who “destroyed this pleasant simplicity and specificity” when he wrote the 
general non-separable utility function that we used in equation (1) and is now commo
currency in economics.16  
 It will be useful to recall why ad
To begin with, they were seen to be an unnecessary restriction. Moreover, on careful 
examination, we see complements and substitutes everywhere – such as left shoes and
right shoes for the former or beef and chicken for the latter. Addictions are examples of 
strong intertemporal complementarities that are well established in economics and 
psychology. People are often embarrassed about eating alone in a restaurant, while 
Robert Putnam has classified the activity of “bowling alone” as symptomatic of the 
decline of social capital. While understanding dependences over time, space, and
activities is a challenging task for time-use research, measuring these relationships w




The ambitious program of hedonic psychology is to construct measures of pain and 
uld be a 
                                                           
 
pleasure to complement existing quantitative social indicators. Can an index of 
happiness (or misery, or more generally of emotions) can be constructed that wo
meaningful social indicator. Is this even theoretically possible? I think not.17 
 
 
16 The quotation is from George Stigler, “The Development of Utility Theory. I,” The Journal of 
 I do not discuss here whether such measures would be worthwhile social indicators, whether 
 
Political Economy, vol. 58, no. 4, August 1950, pp. 307-327, at p. 322. 
 
17
this view of human aspirations is too impoverished to be interesting, or the many paradoxes that
arise in its interpretation. These issues have been widely debated in philosophical discussions of 
utilitarianism, such as Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, Eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond, 








It makes no sense to use such measures of emotions as quantitative social 
indicat lties in 
, 
, 








log(2) times as happy? Moreover, they are likely to be individually ordinal in the sense 
                                                         
l, while interpersonal cardinality is needed to qualify as a meaningful quantitati
social indicator. Assume for purposes of discussion that we have developed a perfect 
hedonimeter based on brain scanning, and further that we have accurate techniques th
map how brain images correspond to reported pain, pleasure, sadness, sweetness, or 
other features of reported emotions. Perhaps we can even calibrate the level of pain or
frustration that would make me frown or grind my teeth. Would it make any sense to 
add these together, or to average these emotions? 
 
ors because they are not interpersonally cardinal. We point to three difficu
existing approaches.18 To begin with, it seems unlikely that we can define a condition 
that would represent an unambiguous “zero” or “neutral” emotional state (other than 
being dead, which is not appealing in this context). Because emotions are so contingent
the zero point will vary with mood, circumstances, genetics, context, history, and 
culture. Therefore, there is unlikely to be a natural zero point for happiness, misery
pain, or other emotions.  
 
S
 apply across people. We cannot say how the incremental pleasure that Sam 
experiences in eating a “delicious cheeseburger” compares with the incremental pai
that Helen experiences when she has a “bad headache.”19 Therefore, it is difficult to se
how the increment of emotions can be calibrated across different individuals. 
  
Th
ality; rather they are ordinal in the sense that a state is identified as being “mo
painful” or “happier.”These are ordinal measures because any numerical index that we
construct based on the reported emotions can be “stretched” by a monotonic 
transformation and provide the same information. Can we really say that Sam
cheeseburger makes him twice as happy as the first, rather than four times as happy, or 
    
18 The discussion that follows is hardly original with the present author. It goes back at least to 
Isaiah Berlin, “Utilitarianism” (unpublished, available at 
http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/lists/nachlass/index.htm). 
 
19 The proponents of hedonic psychology are sensitive to this issue and make a case for a natural 
zero point. The psychological evidence against a universal neutral point is reasonably 
compelling, however. For example, whether a blue light is perceived as blue or green or neither-
blue-nor-green will depend upon what the person saw just before the blue light. 
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that we can stretch Sam’s cardinal emotion scale arbitrarily relative to Helen’s. Since the 
individual reported emotions can be each mathematically stretched or transformed and 
maintain the property of more pleasant or less pleasant, the increment and level of any 
aggregate index will be arbitrary depending upon what individual transformations are 
applied. This implies that we cannot generally construct either aggregate indexes of 
emotions over individuals, or even indexes of emotions over time of the same 
individual, in a way that the indexes represent a meaningful representation of the 
changes of individuals. 
 
 An example will illustrate the point. Constructing an index of aggregate pain or 





on the exact details of the index 
at is created. The most problematical indexes are ones that attempt to attribute 
The U-index of KKSSS would appear to avoid the difficulties of some happiness 






do not doubt that in some ideal world we can make measurements of the spatially 
averaged wavelength of the light coming off the water. We might be able to measure the
physiological responses to particular wavelengths of light in different people. More
we could potentially correlate these physiological responses with how people describe 
their experience: whether the river is “blue” or “deep blue,” or even so pleasurable as to 
inspire a song about “the beautiful blue Danube.” However, it would make no sense to 
construct a national index of “Blueness of the Danube River” that involved adding up 
how individuals on a particular day report the experience of looking at the Danube 
River. Nor would it make sense to have an index of “Blueness” that would go up or 
down from day to day depending upon unemployment, inflation, or per capita incom
Neither blue rivers nor blue moods constitute a meaningful index of emotions becaus
they are not based on interpersonally cardinal variables. 
 
 The force of these criticisms will differ depending up
th
differences in happiness over time and people to particular causes. These would appear 
to suffer from many of the criticisms discussed here.  
 
 
difficulty into the background. To illustrate their procedure, we can simplify by 
assuming that we measure a pain sub-index, P, and a happiness sub-index, H. Then
construct a net misery index, M, which equals 1 if P >H and equals 0 if H > P. Wh
looks ordinal, it actually makes very strong assumptions about the sub-indexes. This
approach is equivalent to assuming that that there are interpersonally cardinal sub-
indexes in an underlying preference function, U(P,H). The sub-indexes assume 
interpersonal cardinality in the sense that the zeros must be the equivalent for each s
-21- 
 
index [that is, U(0,H) = U(P,0) for all P and H]; and that the utility increments m




∂ ∂=∂ ∂  for every 
reason to assume that the U indexes would be interpersonally comparable either across 
persons or for over time for individuals. 
  
 We leave the last word to the philoso
point of the function where P = U]. Even with these strong assumptions, there is no 
pher who launched the utilitarian revolution, 
entham. He expressed his own reservations about utility measurement as 
 in vain to speak of adding quantities which after the addition will continue to 









man's happiness; a gain of one man is no gain to another; you may as well 
pretend to add 20 apples to 20 pears, which after you had done that could not 
40 of anything but 20 of each just as there was before. 
 
 
20 Quoted in George Stigler, “The Development of Utility Theory. I,” The Journal of Political 


































Figure 2. Valuation with the time-slice methodology 
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